Voting in the bicameral Congress: large majorities as a signal of quality by Katz, Gabriel et al.
Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities
as a Signal of Quality
Matias Iaryczower*




Department of Political Science, UCSD
We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information
about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. In equilibrium, the
Senate only approves House bills that receive the support of a supermajority
of members of the lower chamber. We estimate this endogenous supermajority
rule to be about four-ﬁfths on average across policy areas. Our results indicate
that the value of information dispersed among legislators is signiﬁcant, and that
in equilibrium a large fraction of House members’ (40–50%) votes following their
private information. Finally, we show that the probability of a type I error in
Congress (not passing a good bill) is on average about twice as high as the
probability of a type II error (passing a low-quality bill). (JELC11, C13, D72, D78).
1. Introduction
One of the main arguments for bicameralism is that a bicameral legislature
can improve the quality of public policy vis-a`-vis a unicameral system
(see (Tsebelis and Money 1997), and references therein). Evaluating the
quality of proposals is indeed a key consideration in legislative settings.
As numerous examples and a vast literature show (see Krehbiel 1991), two
key points seem to be largely uncontroversial. First, most issues decided in
Congress have a common value dimension, be it the technical merit of the
proposal or its appropriateness for the given state of the environment.
Second, the information about these common value components is dis-
persed throughout the members of Congress: no individual knows the
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whole truth, but each individual has some valuable information to im-
prove the quality of legislation (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999; Londregan 1999, 2000).
With common values and dispersed information, legislators will
generally be able to use the information contained in the voting decisions
of other members of Congress to shape their own decision of how to vote.
A natural question then emerges: Does bicameralism affect the voting
behavior of members of Congress? And if so, what are the implications
for policy outcomes of adopting a bicameral legislature? This article
addresses these questions by analyzing roll call voting data in the U.S.
Congress.
Doing so demands a new approach to the analysis of roll call voting
data. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Poole and Rosenthal
(1985, 1991), a large empirical literature made considerable progress in
understanding the voting behavior of members of the U.S. Congress.1
This progress relied on a fully micro-founded (i.e., structural) approach,
based on the sincere (nonstrategic) spatial voting model of decision-
making in committees (SSV). In other words, these analyses take the
SSV model as given, and then recover the parameters of the model as
those that best ﬁt the data.
While the SSV model has several appealing properties, it also makes
strong implicit and explicit assumptions that shape the analysis and inter-
pretation of roll call data. In particular, the SSV model assumes that the
legislative setting is entirely about conﬂict resolution, precluding legisla-
tors from considering the technical merit or appropriateness of proposals
for the given state of the environment. As a result, the SSVmodel rules out
the possibility that bicameralism can shape the quality of public policy.2
For the same reasons, the SSV model led to a disconnection in the
analysis of voting in the two chambers of Congress. In this private
values model, a legislator votes in favor of a proposal if and only if the
proposal is closer to her ideal policy than the status quo: the votes of other
members do not contain information that would help a legislator improve
her decision. In particular, legislators in one chamber cannot gain any
1. Within this framework, the literature tackled a diverse array of issues, including sta-
bility and polarization in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 1997; McCarty et al. 2001),
the role of Committees (Londregan and Snyder 1994; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), and the
inﬂuence of political parties (Snyder and Groseclose 2000; McCarty et al. 2001; Cox and
Poole 2002).
2. The SSV can be extended to include a publicly known valence differential between
alternatives. In fact, as pointed out by Londregan (1999), the two models are equivalent: a
valence advantage for the proposal against the status quo is indistinguishable from a more
extreme status quo (and no valence). Thus we cannot separately identify the midpoint be-
tween two alternatives and the valence differential. Extending the spatial model to incorpor-
ate common values and dispersed information is a different matter. This is the focus of this
article (see also Iaryczower and Shum, 2012a).
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relevant information by observing (or conditioning on) the outcome of the
vote in the other chamber. As a result, the empirical analysis of voting in
Congress treated the consideration of the same bill in the two separate
chambers as statistically (and theoretically) independent.
But with dispersed information about the quality of the proposal, a
bicameral legislature can amount to more than a sequence of separate
chambers. If at least some members of the originating chamber use their
information to guide their voting decision, the outcome of their vote will
become a public signal for members of the receiving chamber. In fact, this
is consistent with anecdotal evidence from comparable political institu-
tions with two-tier committee systems. In universities, for example, votes
for tenured appointments with divided support in the faculty often fail at
the administration level, or are not even presented for consideration.
A similar phenomenon seems to hold in committee-ﬂoor considerations
in legislatures and in the courts.3
The model of common values and dispersed information suggests that
this is due to the fact that the voting outcome in the originating committee
aggregates information about the quality of the proposal vis-a`-vis the
status quo. A divided vote in an academic committee is problematic be-
cause it sends the administration a signal of low quality; similarly, a
divided vote in a standing committee signals to the full membership that
the proposal might be a poor response for the current state of affairs.4
Does the bicameral Congress lead to the same kind of ﬁltering of ﬂawed
proposals as in the above examples?
We begin by establishing some key facts about the impact of bicameral-
ism on legislative outcomes. To do so, we link the votes of bills originated
in the House to their continuation in the Senate (we consider all bills that
originated in the House, and whose passage in the House was decided by
a roll call vote in the 102–109th Congresses; i.e., between 1991 and 2006).
A basic analysis of the data makes two facts apparent. First, a large
number of bills approved by the House die in the Senate. In fact, 45%
of all bills passed by the House are never taken up for consideration on
ﬁnal passage by the Senate, and almost one quarter of all bills approved in
the House reach consideration on ﬁnal passage in the Senate only after
3. As (Oleszek, 2004) points out, bills “voted out of committee unanimously stand a good
chance on the ﬂoor . . . [while a] sharply divided committee vote presages an equally sharp
dispute on the ﬂoor.” In their analysis of decision-making in the courts, Cross and Tiller
(1998) argue that courts of appeals are more likely to follow Supreme Court doctrine when
they are ideologically divided because of the potential forwhistleblowing; i.e., the threat of the
minority member to signal the court’s disobedience to a higher court or Congress, inducing a
possible reversal.
4. One might argue that it is not relevant whether the entire committee is divided, but
instead whether some particular subset of the membership tends to agree or be divided about
the issue. This argument, as we explain in more detail below, is not only correct but also
consistent with our analysis, and simpliﬁed here only for simplicity of exposition.
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being heavily amended by that body.5 Second, the analysis illustrates a
previously unknown fact. As in standing committees and universities, also
in the US Congress proposals with a larger support in the originating
chamber tend to be more successful in the receiving chamber.
The correlation between voting outcomes across chambers does not
necessarily rule out the SSV model: any data with this property can be
explained within the SSV model if the preferences of members of both
chambers are properly aligned. However, we show they are not: The esti-
mates of the SSV model that are consistent with the individual voting data
generate large errors in passage rates of the same bill across chambers.
We then characterize the equilibrium voting behavior in a theoretical
framework that is consistent with common values and dispersed informa-
tion. In the model, a bicameral legislature considers a proposal against the
status quo. The proposal is considered sequentially, ﬁrst by the House and
then (if it was approved) by the Senate, and has to be approved by both
chambers to be enacted into law. The proposal can be of high or low
quality, and individuals only have imperfect private signals about its qual-
ity. All individuals prefer a good proposal, but individuals differ in the
amount of information supporting the proposal that would induce them
to vote for it. We argue that the data are consistent with a particular class
of equilibria of the theoretical model in which (1) only a fraction of mem-
bers of the House vote informatively, and (2) the Senate only approves
House bills that receive the support of an endogenous supermajority of
representatives.
We estimate the model within the Bayesian framework via Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. The statistical model comprises
two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we implement a ﬁnite mixture model to estimate
legislators’ behavioral types and the proposal’s common value component
in six different policy areas. In this step, we also estimate the precision of
legislators’ private information. In a second step, we estimate the equilib-
rium cutpoint in the Senate based on the assignment of legislators into
types in the ﬁrst stage and on the realized vote outcome for each bill that
passed the House.
The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes.
First, our estimates imply that private information (information dispersed
in the system that has not been made public and incorporated in the prior)
is quite important. For one, a large fraction of the House votes according
to their private information in each case (from 40% in the case of
Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary bills). Moreover, the results
show that the informativeness or precision of the signals is relatively large
across all issue areas. Thus, large majorities are indeed informative about
the quality of proposals. Second, in order to induce this degree of
5. Congressional scholars have provided anecdotal evidence suggesting that many bills
passed by the House die in the Senate. A systematic and quantitative documentation of this
phenomenon, however, does not appear to exist in the previous literature.
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informative voting, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority rule
on members of the House. We estimate this supermajority rule to be about
four-ﬁfths on average across policy areas. In other words, in equilibrium
bicameralism is transformed into a unicameral system with a four-ﬁfths
supermajority rule. This endogenous majority rule has signiﬁcant vari-
ation across areas: close to two thirds for Foreign Relations, and larger
for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations (0.89). Third, we show that
the probability of a type I error in Congress (rejecting a high-quality bill) is
on average about twice as high as the probability of a type II error (passing
a low-quality bill). This is true on average across issues, and also issue by
issue, with the exception of Appropriations. The discrepancy is lower in
Foreign Relations and larger in Economics and Judiciary Bills.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the main features of the data, and
considers the implications of the SSV model for the passage or proposals
across chambers. Section 4 introduces the theoretical model and summar-
izes its empirical implications. Section 5 presents the econometric speciﬁ-
cation and estimation methodology. Section 6 presents the results. Section
7 concludes and discusses possible directions for future research.
2. Related Literature
This article builds on an extensive literature studying the policy impli-
cations of bicameral legislatures (see (Dahl 1956; Riker 1982; Lijphart
1984; Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis and Money 1997; and Diermeier and
Myerson 1999, among many others; see also the classical analyses of
Montesquieu 1748, and Hamilton et al. 1788).6
Our article focuses on what Tsebelis and Money (1997) call the efﬁ-
ciency rationale for bicameralism, emphasizing the importance of
common values in the legislative setting (Rogers 1998, 2001). Different
from previous contributions, our argument emphasizes the importance of
dispersed information about the quality of proposals. As such, our ana-
lysis is connected with the literature on strategic transmission of informa-
tion from specialized committees to the full chamber pioneered by
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and Krehbiel (1991).7 Differently than in
the cheap talk models of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan and
Krehbiel (1987), the focus here is on communication through voting.
6. For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Longley and Oleszek (1989), Tsebelis
and Money (1997), Cutrone and McCarty (2006), and references therein.
7. To be clear, in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)’s theoretical framework, legislators are
uncertain about the precise mapping from policy to outcomes. However, asHirsch and Shotts
(2008) point out, “many of the examples of information and expertise in Krehbiel (1991) are
better described by a model of information as policy-speciﬁc valence than by the x¼ p+!
model.” See also Epstein and O’Halloran (1999). Moreover, with risk averse legislators, and
under some conditions, reducing the uncertainty about the policy implications of a proposal
is equivalent to improving its quality.
Voting in the Bicameral Congress 5
 at U
niversity of California, San D






Furthermore, an important innovation of our analysis is that we focus on
the strategic considerations among members in different chambers, each
of them a (multimember) committee. To do so, we build on the theoretical
literature on strategic voting with common values and incomplete infor-
mation (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997,
1998) and, more speciﬁcally, on analyses dealing with strategic inter-
actions among members of different committees (Piketty 2000; Maug
and Yilmaz 2002; Razin 2003; and in particular Iaryczower 2008).8
On the methodological side, our article is related to the various contri-
butions studying the voting behavior of members of Congress based on an
underlying behavioral model. The seminal paper here is Poole and
Rosenthal (1985), where—starting from the assumption that the data
are generated according to the sincere voting spatial model—the authors
develop NOMINATE, a method to estimate the parameters of the spatial
model: legislators’ ideal points and separating hyperplanes for each roll
call.9 Londregan (1999) allows a (publicly known) valence advantage in
the spatial voting model, and proposes to incorporate features of the pro-
cess of agenda formation to deal with the incidental parameters problem
present in the agnostic SSV (see also Londregan 2000; Clinton and
Meirowitz 2003, 2004). Our article joins these efforts to incorporate stra-
tegic considerations into the analysis of voting in legislatures. To our
knowledge, our article is the ﬁrst to estimate a model of strategic voting
with common values and dispersed information in a bicameral legislature
(see Iaryczower et al. 2011; Iaryczower and Shum 2012a,b, for related
work in the Court).
3. Bicameralism and Legislative Outcomes
In this section, we describe the data and document and how the sequential
organization of the US Congress affects legislative outcomes. In Section
3.1 we use these data to evaluate the performance of the SSV in terms of
aggregate voting outcomes.
Our data consist of all bills that were originated in the House, and whose
passage in the House was decided by a roll call vote over the period 1991–
2006 (Congresses 102 through 109).10 By bills, we refer loosely to both bills
(say H.R. 100) and Joint Resolutions (say H.J.Res.100)—which have the
8. See also Cross and Tiller (1998) for a theory of minority decisions in the courts of
appeals as signals to higher courts.
9. Still based on the spatial model with sincere voting, Heckman and Snyder (1997),
Jackman (2001), and Clinton et al. (2004) propose alternative estimation methods.
Heckman and Snyder (1997) build on the random utility model with unobservable attributes
for the characteristics of the bill and the status quo. Clinton et al. (2004) develop a Bayesian
procedure for the estimation and inference of spatial models of roll call voting (see also
Jackman 2001).
10. In principle, it would be desirable to also include bills originated in the Senate.
Unfortunately, during the period under study only a very small number of the bills originated
in the Senate passed in the Senate by a roll call vote. Due to this data availability restriction, in
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same effect as bills unless they are used to propose amendments to the
Constitution. We say that a bill was originated in the House if the bill was
voted on ﬁnal passage in the House before being voted on ﬁnal passage in
the Senate. We consider here only votes on ﬁnal passage, thus ignoring
votes on procedure or amendments. Moreover, we consider only bills that
passed the House by a roll call vote, in which members’ votes are recorded
individually and that record is made publicly available prior to consider-
ation of the bill in the Senate.
Under the House rules, bills are considered for approval by a simple
majority vote of Representatives in a vote On Passage (OP). Bills can also
be approved in the House by an alternative streamlined procedure, called
Suspend the Rules and Pass (SRP). In a SRP vote, debate is restricted,
amendments are not allowed, and the bill has to be approved by a
two-thirds majority. Our data consist of bills considered on ﬁnal passage
either by a standard OP vote or by the SRP procedure. Between 1991 and
2006, 950 House bills had a roll call On Passage, and 861 had a roll call
vote on SRP.11
To be considered approved by the Congress, bills need to be passed in
identical form by the House and the Senate.12 Once a bill is passed by the
House, its fate in the Senate can be classiﬁed in three categories. We con-
sider that a bill passes (P) if it is approved by the Senate without any
amendments during the same Congressional session in which it is initiated
in the House. An original bill is considered to be passed amended (A) if it is
approved by the Senate with amendments during the same Congressional
session in which it is initiated in the House. We also consider that a bill
is passed amended if it fails in the Senate by inaction, but a related bill
(as classiﬁed by the Library of Congress, in Thomas) that reached the
chamber’s ﬂoor passed the Senate. Finally a bill fails (F) if it reaches the
Senate ﬂoor and is voted down, or if it is never taken up for consideration.
The latter case occurs when: (a) no action whatsoever is taken in the
Senate during the Congress in which the House passed the bill; (b) a bill
is never reported to the Floor by the Senate committee to which it was
referred; (c) the bill does not progress after being placed on the Senate’s
legislative calendar; or (d) the bill fails on a vote on cloture on the motion
to proceed. Regardless of the particular way in which it takes place,
this article we limit our analysis to bills that originated in the House. We leave a more
comprehensive analysis for future research.
11. It is worth noting that “most” bills put up for a vote on ﬁnal passage in theHouse do in
fact pass the House. Speciﬁcally, this amounted to>90% of the 1811 votes on ﬁnal passage in
our database.
12. If the House and the Senate pass different versions of a bill, their disagreements are
often resolved through a conference committee, an ad hoc joint committee composed of
delegations of both chambers. Conferees usually draft a modiﬁed version of the bill in ques-
tion, which is subsequently considered sequentially under a closed rule by the House and the
Senate. Our sample includes 237 bills that were considered by the House for a ﬁnal passage
roll call vote after a conference committee.
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Senatorial inaction is akin to killing a bill. Figure 1 presents the fate of
House bills in the Senate.
The ﬁgure illustrates two key points. First, a fairly signiﬁcant fraction of
bills that reach the Senate (38%) do get voted in the Senate as is.
Moreover, once put up for a vote, almost all of these bills in fact pass
the vote in the Senate (only one in 77 bills voted by roll call and one in 432
bills voted by voice vote failed to pass). However, being up for consider-
ation in the Senate is hardly a synonym of success. In fact, a staggering
37% (718) of the House bills that reached the Senate in the period under
study were not taken up for consideration on ﬁnal passage: 75 were
ignored, 481 never made it out of committee, 200 were reported out of
committee and put on calendar but were never voted, and 10 failed a vote
to pass a ﬁlibuster. In addition, almost a quarter of the bills (475) only
reached consideration for ﬁnal passage after being heavily amended by the
body. Thus, a second fact is that—even before considering amendments—
a large number of bills that passed the House die in the Senate. It follows
that if legislators are outcome oriented and strategic, analyzing voting
outcomes independently across chambers, without linking votes and out-
comes to its continuation in the receiving chamber, can be problematic.
The ﬁgure has two additional implications. First, the selection of bills
into OP or SRP considerations is not random or innocuous. Pieces of
legislation that were approved in the House using the SRP procedure
(and thus received the support of at least two-thirds of its members)
were more likely to be approved without amendments by the Senate
than bills approved by a simple majority (OP). The opposite is true with
Figure 1. The Fate of House Bills in the Senate.
8 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
 at U
niversity of California, San D






regard to those bills that were approved after being heavily amended in the
Senate. House bills that were approved in the House using simple majority
(OP) are more likely to be approved with amendments by the Senate than
bills approved using a SRP procedure. Note also that bills approved in the
House using simple majority (OP) are more likely to fail than those passed
under SRP.
Second, the ﬁgure also suggests that after a bill is voted by the two
chambers, and a compromise is reached within the conference committee,
all private information is made public, and no uncertainty about the qual-
ity of the bill remains. In fact, there is almost no variation in outcomes
after a bill is reported from the conference committee: approximately 95%
of these bills (225) were passed (without amendments) once they reached
the Senate. We henceforth exclude these bills from our analyses.
Support for the Bill in the House: Does it Matter?
As we mentioned in the introduction, a stylized fact about bicameral sys-
tems in various political institutions is that proposals that pass the origi-
nating committee without signiﬁcant objections tend to be more successful
in the receiving committee than those proposals that clear the ﬁrst com-
mittee with a contested vote. Does the bicameral system in the Congress
lead to similar outcomes?
To tackle this question, we begin by considering whether the outcome of
the bill in the Senate is “correlated” with the fraction of members of the
House supporting the bill. To measure this aggregate support, we compute
the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House (number
of “aye” votes minus number of “nay” votes) for each bill in the
sample. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution (kernel density
estimates) of the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House
conditional on two possible outcomes in the Senate: the bill passes (P) and
the bill fails (F).
The ﬁgure shows a signiﬁcant difference in the Pass and Fail conditional
distributions, especially for bills considered OP. The distribution of
the tally in the House conditional on a Senate Fail (a Senate Pass) puts
a relatively large probability mass on low (high) values of the tally.
In other words, bills that are approved by the Senate tend to have
higher tallies in the House than bills that fail in the Senate.13
The same conclusion holds if we separate bills by different policy areas.
To do this, we use the committee/s to which the bill was referred to classify
each roll call as pertaining to one of six policy areas: Appropriations,
Foreign Relations, Economic Activity, Judiciary, Government Opera-
tions, and Others.14 The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the “Senate
13. In fact, we can saymore. Bills that passed the Senate typically have higher tallies in the
House than bills that pass amended in the Senate, and these in turn have higher tallies than
bills that fail in the Senate.
14. We obtained the basic referral information from the Library of Congress, in Thomas.
We classify a bill in “Appropriations” if it was referred to the Appropriations committee, and
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Fail” and “Senate Pass” conditional distributions of the net tally of votes
in favor of the proposal in the House for votes OP in Appropriations and
Judiciary. Once again, the evidence indicates that pieces of legislation that
were approved in the House with a larger net number of favorable votes
are more likely to be approved by the Senate than bills approved with less
legislative support.
3.1 The Sincere Voting Spatial Model in Bicameral Perspective
The ﬁndings in the previous section are consistent with, but do not neces-
sarily imply that the tally of votes in the House is transmitting relevant
Figure 2. Tally of Votes in the House and Outcomes in the Senate.
to “Other” if it was referred to multiple committees. If a bill was referred to a single com-
mittee other than appropriations, we classify it in one of the remaining four classes: Foreign
Relations (includes Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, National Security, Veterans’ Affairs,
Homeland Security and Intelligence), Economic Activity (includes Agriculture, Science,
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Natural Resources,
Small Business, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries),
Judiciary (includes Judiciary), and Government Operations (includes Budget, Government
Reform, and Ways and Means).
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information to members of the Senate. In particular, the correlation be-
tween the tally of favorable votes in the House and the outcomes in the
Senate could also be consistent with the sincere voting spatial model. If the
preferences of members of both chambers are correlated, then proposals
that only receive the support of a small number of House members should
also receive the support of a small number of Senators, while proposals
that are overwhelmingly preferred to the status quo in the House should
also be favored by a winning coalition in the Senate.
It should be clear, however, that the estimates of the SSVmodel that are
consistent with the individual voting data will not necessarily be consistent
with the responsiveness of the outcome in the Senate to the tally of votes in
favor of the proposal in the House. For example, if preferences are per-
fectly aligned across chambers and both committees decide by simple
majority rule, then all proposals that clear the ﬁrst committee will clear
the second committee as well. This, however, would be inconsistent with
the passage rates described in the previous section. As a result, although
not necessarily ruling out the SSV model, the correlation in voting out-
comes suggest that the match between the data and the model should be
reconsidered.
In this section, we evaluate this alternative hypothesis using Keith
Poole’s Optimal Classiﬁcation (OC) common-space estimates.15 The
sincere-voting spatial model is characterized by two sets of parameters.
The ﬁrst is the set of legislators’ ideal points in the House and the Senate.
Second, for each roll call, there is an associated separating line L, that
partitions the space into two half spaces. Legislators with ideal points to
either side of L are predicted to vote “aye” and “nay”, respectively. The
basic idea is to use the separating line estimated for each roll call in the
House, together with the estimates of the ideal points of Senators to obtain
a predicted outcome in the Senate (see the Supplementary Appendix for
details.) Having done this, we can then compare the predicted and actual
outcomes in the Senate.
Figure 3 presents the comparison between the predicted outcomes gen-
erated using the OC estimates and the actual Senate outcomes. The top
panel shows the results assuming that a simple majority rule is used to
determine a bill’s passage in the Senate. The bottom panel presents a
similar exercise using a three-ﬁfths majority rule, as required for cloture.
The evidence in Figure 3 shows that the standard spatial model with
sincere voting generates predictions that are at odds with the data.
Consider, for example, the predictions for Judiciary bills assuming that
15. OC is a nonparametric scaling method that maximizes the number of correctly clas-
siﬁed choices (individual votes), assuming that legislators have euclidean preferences and vote
sincerely. In the common-space procedure, OC is used to simultaneously scale every session
of both houses of Congress, using legislators who served in both chambers to place the House
and Senate in the same space. Hence, the estimates of the ideal points/roll call cutpoints are
directly comparable across both chambers. These estimates are publicly available at http://
voteview.com/oc.htm.
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a simple majority voting rule is used. According to the sincere voting
spatial model, 84 bills should have been approved by the Senate (and
only four should have failed). Instead, 10 were approved after being heav-
ily amended and 72 actually failed. A similar pattern holds for the other
policy areas. Although the predicted power of the spatial model improves
if we assume that a three-ﬁfths majority decision rule is employed in the
Senate, prediction errors are still prevalent (Figure 3).16
Figure 3. Actual and Predicted Outcomes in the Senate According to the SSV Model.
16. Due to the data limitations mentioned in note 10, our main analysis and estimation
focuses on bills that originated in the House. However, an examination of the bills originated
in the Senate shows that also in this case the SSVmodel generates predictions that are at odds
with the data. Between 1991 and 2006, only 106 of the bills originated in the Senate were
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In this section, we present a model (introduced in Iaryczower, 2008) in
which members of a bicameral legislature have dispersed information
about the quality of the proposal. The model develops formally a simple
intuition: if legislators have private information about the relative value of
the alternatives under consideration, voting outcomes in the originating
chamber can aggregate and transmit relevant information to members of
the receiving chamber.
Legislators in the House (H) and the Senate (S) choose between a pro-
posal A and a status quo Q. Chamber j¼H, S is composed of nj (odd)
legislators whose collective choice is determined by voting under a
Rj-majority rule, Rj ¼ nj þ rj=2, for rj2 {1, . . . , nj}. Formally, letting
vi2 {1, 1} denote i’s vote against (1) or in favor (1) of the proposal,
and tðvjÞ 
P
i2Cj vi the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in
chamber j, we say that the proposal passes in chamber j if and only if
t(vj) rj. The proposal is considered sequentially by the two chambers.
The alternatives are ﬁrst voted on in the House. Members of the Senate
observe the outcome of the vote in the House, and then vote between the
two alternatives. The proposal is adopted by Congress if and only if it
passes in both the House and the Senate. For simplicity of exposition, we
assume here that voting is simultaneous within chamber.17
Legislators are imperfectly informed about the quality of the proposal.
The proposal can be good (!¼!A) or bad (!¼!Q). Legislators cannot
observe !, but know that Pr(!¼!A)¼ p. Moreover, each individual i
in chamber j receives an imperfectly informative signal si2 {1, 1} (i.i.d.
conditional on the quality of the proposal), such that Pr(si¼ 1j!A)¼
Pr(si¼1j!Q)¼ qj> 1/2. We assume moreover that the signals of mem-
bers of the originating chamber are more informative than the members of
the receiving chamber; and in particular that qH=ð1 qHÞ5q2S=ð1 qSÞ2.
Legislators’ preferences have an ideological and a common value com-
ponent. Each legislator i2Cj has a publicly known ideology bias either for
or against the proposal, and we say that i is either pro or anti. We denote
the number of pros and antis in chamber j by mj and mj, respectively. Pros
and antis differ in their ranking of alternatives conditional on observing
the same information I . In particular, pros face a cost of 2 (0, 1) if a bad
proposal passes and a cost of 1 if a good proposal does not pass, but
antis face a cost of  2 ð; 1Þ if a bad proposal passes and a cost 1  if
a good proposal does not pass. The payoffs for both types, if a good
proposal passes or a bad proposal does not pass, is normalized to zero.
approved by a roll call vote on passage. According to the SSVmodel, 100 of these bills should
have been approved by the House and only 6 should have failed. Instead, 53 bills actually
failed, and 27 only passed the House after being amended.
17. It follows fromDekel and Piccione (2000) that the result of Proposition 1 is unchanged
if voting within each chamber is sequential as well.
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Thus pros prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(!AjI ),
whereas antis are willing to support the proposal only if Prð!AjIÞ5 > .
It will be convenient to measure legislators’ biases in terms of the
smallest number of positive House signals a legislator would need to ob-
serve for her to vote for the proposal, having observed n positive Senate
signals. We call these thresholds (n) (for pros) and ðnÞ (for antis). We
assume that ð0Þ > 1, and (0)< 1; i.e., one positive House signal is not
enough to convince an anti to support the bill, whereas one negative
House signal is not enough to convince a pro to vote against the bill.
Strategies and Equilibrium
A (pure) strategy for a legislator i2Cj is amapping i from the set of signals
{1, 1} and feasible histories Hj to a vote vi2 {1, 1 }, with HH¼;,
HS¼ {vH : t(vH) rH}. We say that i votes informatively if i(si, hj)¼ si
for si¼1, 1 and hj2Hj. We consider Perfect Bayesian equilibria in
pure strategies, with a reﬁnement. As the game stands, it is possible that
in equilibrium members of both chambers vote for or against the proposal
independently of their belief about its quality, simply because in this strat-
egy proﬁle their vote cannot change policy outcomes. These equilibria,
however, can be nonrobust to small perturbations to the voting behavior
of committee members around their equilibrium strategies. To rule out this
possibility we consider the following perturbation of the game. With prob-
ability 1 t, a committee member i is a moderate, and has the preferences
described above; with probability t> 0, she is a partisan. Conditional on
being a partisan, i votes for (against) the proposal unconditionally with
probability  (respectively, 1). We say that a strategy proﬁle () is a
voting equilibrium if there exists an  > 0 such that for all 5  there exist
beliefs fi ðsijsi; hjÞg such that (, t) is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) of the game t in pure anonymous strategies.
18
4.1 Results
For the purposes of this article, it is useful to separate equilibria of the
model in two classes, according to whether the House bill can fail and
succeed on a vote in the Senate with positive probability or not. Because in
the data House bills are never killed on a vote in the Senate ﬂoor, we rule
out equilibria of the ﬁrst class as possible data-generating processes, and
focus instead on equilibria in which only members of the House (the
originating chamber) vote informatively.19 In all equilibria with these
18. This is a relatively strong reﬁnement, to establish the robustness of the equilibria we
identify. These equilibria are also sequential, and weakly undominated. We can also consider
a similar reﬁnement to the one we propose here, in which pros (antis) can only be partisan for
(against) the proposal. In this case, the requirement that qH>> qS in the Proposition is not
needed.
19. Under some conditions, there are equilibria in which members of both the originating
and receiving committees vote informatively. In an equilibrium of this class, the probability
that the proposal passes in the receiving committee increases (strictly) with the tally of votes in
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characteristics, members of the Senate disregard their private information,
and act only to raise the hurdle that the alternative has to surpass in the
House to defeat the status quo, killing the proposal following low vote
tallies in the House, and unconditionally approving the proposal other-
wise.20 For this reason we refer to these equilibria as endogenous majority
rule equilibria (EMR).
The next proposition fully characterizes EMR voting equilibria. There
are two cases, depending on whether pros have a winning coalition in the
Senate (i.e., msRs) or not.
Proposition 1.
1. If pros are a winning coalition in the Senate, there exists an EMR
voting equilibrium if and only if ð1Þ4ðmH mH  rHÞ=2. In equi-
librium k pros in the House vote informatively, and mH k pros vote
unconditionally for the proposal, whereas antis in the House vote un-
conditionally against the proposal. The proposal passes in the Senate if
and only if the net tally of votes of pros voting informatively in the
House is above (1).
2. If pros are not a winning coalition in the Senate, there exists an
EMR voting equilibrium if and only if ð1Þ4max ðmH mH þ rHÞ=

2 1; nH  rH  1þ ð0Þg. In equilibrium k0 antis vote informatively,
and other antis in the House vote unconditionally against the
proposal, whereas pros vote unconditionally for the proposal. The
proposal passes in the Senate if and only if the net tally of votes of
antis voting informatively in the House is above ð1Þ.
The proof of this result follows from Iaryczower (2008), and is included
in the Supplementary Appendix for completeness.
To illustrate the logic driving the result, consider ﬁrst a unicameral
system with pure common values, with bias ~  ð0Þ. The main result of
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) is that there exists an equilibrium in
which all legislators vote informatively iff ~ ¼ r. When this is not the
case, it is still possible to support a responsive equilibrium with some
informative voting. This can take two forms: either a symmetric equilib-
rium in mixed strategies or an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies,
in which k members vote informatively. The intuition driving the result
is the same in both cases. Here the number of informative votes k is
chosen so that for any voting member, the information provided by the
favor of the proposal in the originating committee. To achieve this, the number of individuals
voting informatively in the receiving committee must vary following different vote tallies in
the originating committee (see Iaryczower 2008).
20. Note that in equilibrium it is common knowledge for members of the Senate whether
the proposal will pass in the Senate or not after observing the outcome of the vote in the
House. Thus, differently to equilibria in which members of both the originating and receiving
chambers vote informatively, here it is immaterial whether the proposal fails in the Senate by
a vote, by scheduling, or by burying it in a Committee.
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equilibrium strategies conditional on her being pivotal exactly compen-
sates the imbalance between the voting rule r and the bias ~. For the same
reason, the number of informative votes in this equilibrium is decreasing
in the difference (in absolute value) between r and ~. A similar result holds
if, as it is the case in our model, we introduce two groups with different
biases. The basic idea is that members not voting informatively will only
act to relax or tighten the effective majority rule for individuals voting
informatively.
Now consider the bicameral setting. Suppose that the Senate kills the
House bill for all voting outcomes in the House in which the net tally of
votes in favor of the bill is below some critical number 	, and uncondi-
tionally approves the House bill otherwise. For members of the House
voting informatively, this situation is equivalent to a unicameral system
with a modiﬁed majority rule 	. It follows that if we can induce members
of the relevant decisive coalition in the Senate to choose 	 so that the
ensuing endogenous majority rule for individuals voting informatively in
the House is equal to (0) (if they are pros) or ð0Þ (if antis), these indi-
viduals would have an incentive to vote informatively in the ﬁrst place.
Proposition 1 shows the conditions under which this can be achieved, and
provides the theoretical foundations of the econometric speciﬁcation that
we describe in the next section.21
5. Estimation
5.1 Econometric Specification
In EMR voting equilibria, only members of the House (the originating
chamber) vote informatively. The Senate acts only to raise the hurdle that
the alternative has to surpass in the House in order to defeat the status quo
in equilibrium. As a result, the votes of individual members of the Senate
do not provide relevant information for the econometrician. In the House,
instead, all votes contain useful information to recover the structure of the
model: (a) the prior probability that the quality of the proposal is high, (b)
the type and strategy of each individual, and (c) the precision of their
private information. The data therefore consist of an nT matrix v of
voting data in the House, and a 1 (TTF) vector z of outcomes of
House bills in the Senate. Here, T is the number of votes in which
the House is the originating chamber, TF is the number of votes in the
House in which the proposal failed in the House, and n is the number of
representatives. Column t is therefore the voting record for all represen-
tatives in roll call t, vt, with i-th entry vit2 {1, 1, ;}.
21. The inference problem of members of the House voting uninformatively is different
than that of members voting informatively, and (given the equilibrium reﬁnement) introduces
additional constraints to equilibrium strategies.
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Let () denote the assignment of roll calls t¼ 1, . . . ,T to issues
g¼ 1, . . . ,G according to the classiﬁcation in issue areas of Section 3.
We assume that the information technology—the prior probability that
the bill is of high quality and the precision of legislators’ private informa-
tion—can differ across issues, but is invariant within issues. Legislators’
preferences, and therefore ultimately the equilibrium being played, are
allowed to vary both across issues and congressional sessions, but are
ﬁxed within a session of Congress and issue area.
Within each issue g and Congress c, therefore, the preferences and
voting strategy of each member of the House are ﬁxed, and can be sum-
marized by a behavioral type 	igc2 {Y, I, N}. Here, 	igc¼Y (respectively,
	igc¼N) denotes that in issue g and legislative term c, i votes uncondition-
ally for (against) the proposal, and 	igc¼ I indicates that i votes inform-
atively in issue g and Congress c, supporting the proposal when si¼ 1 but
voting against it when si¼1. The type of an individual i in congressional
session c is therefore a 1G vector 	i (	i1c, . . . , 	iGc). Since the precision
of signals is also allowed to vary by issue, q (q1, . . . , qG). The common
prior probability that the bill is of high quality is also issue-speciﬁc. Given
independence of states between roll calls, which we assume throughout,
then Pr(!t¼!A)¼ p(t) and p (p1, . . . , pG). For each class g there is also
an EMR voting equilibrium cutpoint 
g in the Senate. The vector of Senate
equilibrium cutpoints is then 
 (
1, . . . , 
G). Finally, we assume that there
is a probability of error  at the individual level, so that whenever equi-
librium behavior dictates a vote v2 {1, 1}, the observed value is v with
probability 1 and v with probability . We can then write down an
expression for the likelihood of data y¼ (v, z) given (q, p,	, 
). First,






Prðytjpg; qg; 	g; 
gÞ: ð1Þ
Next, given (t)¼ g, since the outcome in the Senate depends only on
the relevant cutpoint 
g and on the informative tally, itself a function
only of vt and 	g, we have that
Prðytjpg; qg; 	g; 
gÞ ¼ Prðvtjpg; qg; 	gÞPrðztjvt; 	g; 
gÞ:
Next we obtain an expression for Pr(vt j pg, qg, 	g). For a¼N, I, Y, let
ma(t, g) j{i2C1 : 	i¼ a, vit¼ 1}j and ‘a(t, g) j{i2C1 : 	i¼ a, vit¼ 1}j
denote the number of individuals of type a in issue g voting in favor
and against the bill, respectively. Now, let g [qg(1)+ (1 qg) ]
denote the probability that an individual i such that 	igc¼ I
votes in favor (against) of the proposal in roll call t if !t¼!A
(if !t¼!Q). Then
Prðfvitgi:	igc¼Ijqg; pgÞ ¼ pgmIðt;gÞg ð1 gÞ‘Iðt;gÞ þ ð1 pgÞð1 gÞmIðt;gÞ‘Iðt;gÞg
h i
:
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Moreover, since Pr(vit¼ 1j	igc¼N)¼, and Pr(vit¼ 1j	igc¼Y)¼ 1,
we have
Prðvtjqg; pg; 	gÞ ¼ mNðt;gÞð1 Þ‘Nðt;gÞ  ð1 ÞmYðt;gÞ‘Yðt;gÞ




Consider now Pr(ztjvt, 	g, 
g). Assume ﬁrst that in the data, we observe
a binary Pass/Fail outcome in the Senate zt2 {0, 1}, as it is in the theory.
For a roll call t in issue g, (t)¼ g, let tðg; vtÞ 
P
i:	igc¼I vi denote the
informative tally. We introduce noise et in the class g cutpoint 
g so that
zt¼ 1 if and only if t(g, vt) 
g+ et, or equivalently if et4 t(g, vt) 
g.
Assuming that et is i.i.d. with c.d.f. F(), then (again, for (t)¼ g)
Prðztjvt; 	g; 
gÞ ¼ ½Fðtðg; vtÞ  
gÞzt ½1 Fðtðg; vtÞ  
gÞ1zt :
In the data, however, we observe not two but three outcomes in
the Senate: bills that Fail, bills that Pass without being amended,
and bills that Pass after being amended in the Senate. In our benchmark
speciﬁcation, we assume that bills either Pass or Fail, but that this ﬁnal out-
come zt2 {0, 1} is unobservable. What we observe is an imperfect signal of
this ﬁnal outcome, z^ 2 fP;A;Fg, with Prðz^t ¼ Ajzt ¼ 0Þ ¼ 1 ,
Prðz^t¼Fjzt ¼ 0Þ¼, Prðz^t ¼ Ajzt ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 , and Prðz^t¼Pjzt ¼ 0Þ¼.
Then:
Prðz^tjtðg; vtÞ; 
gÞ ¼ ½Fðtðg; vtÞ  
gÞIðz^t¼PÞ  ½ð1 Fðtðg; vtÞ  
gÞÞIðz^t¼FÞ
 ½ð1 ÞFðtðg; vtÞ  




Including these additional parameters will naturally increase the model
ﬁt. To assess the robustness of our results we also estimate an alternative
speciﬁcation, ignoring the distinction between bills that pass (P) or pass
amended (A).22 In this alternative binary second-stage model, the depend-
ent variable z^ takes the value 1 for bills that passed in the Senate—with or
without amendments—and 0 for bills that failed.
22. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to this potential problem. In addition
to the binary second-stage model, we also ﬁt an ordered multinomial model with two cut-
points per policy area, 
g,1<
g,2. The assumption here is that a bill fails in the Senate if t(g,
vt)4 
g,1, is amended if 
g,1<t(g,vt)4 
g,2, and passes if t(g, vt)>
g,2. This speciﬁcation is
not strictly derived from our theoretical model. However, it captures the stylized fact that bills
that pass the Senate have higher tallies in the House than those amended, and these in turn
have higher tallies than bills that fail in the Senate (note 13). The results of the benchmark
speciﬁcation are essentially unchanged. See pages 6–8 and 18–29 in the Supplementary
Appendix for additional details and estimation results.
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To estimate the model, we adopt a Bayesian approach. In this setting,
the objects of analysis are the distributions of the parameters (q, p, 
, 	).
We follow a two-step estimation procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we use the
observed votes of each legislator in each issue g and Congress c to estimate
issue-speciﬁc posterior distributions of the signal precision qg, the assign-
ment of legislators into types 	igc2 {N, I, Y}, and the assignment of roll
calls t into high- and low-quality bills, {!Q, !A}. In the second step, we
compute the average informative tally for each bill in issue g based on the
a posteriori assignment of legislators into types, and estimate the EMR
equilibrium cutpoint 
g. Both steps rely on MCMC methods (Gilks et al.
1996; Gelman et al. 2004).23
First Stage
The main idea underlying the estimation of the model is that the vote of
legislator i in a roll call t depends only on her type 	i and the realization of
the state !t (we drop the dependence on the issue class g and Congress c
when there is no room for confusion). From Equations (1) and (2), esti-
mating q would be straightforward if we knew the type of each legislator
and the realization of the state in each roll call. The problem of course is
that 	 and ! are not observable. To address this complication, the ﬁrst step
of our estimation strategy implements a latent class, or ﬁnite mixture,
model.
Latent class analysis is useful to explain heterogeneity in observed cat-
egorical variables (e.g., votes) in terms of a small number of underlying
latent classes or groups (e.g., legislators’ types and state realizations). The
observations in the sample are assumed to arise from mutually exclusive
classes characterized by intra-group homogeneity and inter-group differ-
ences in behavioral or attitudinal patterns, with the association between
the observed indicators being entirely explained by their relationship
to a latent categorical variable (see e.g., McLachlan and Peel 2000). In
our model, these latent variables are the types 	 and the state !. We then
adopt an ex post speciﬁcation for the state, where the state parameter
is given by ! (as opposed to p in an ex ante formulation). Since !t is
independent across t, we can then estimate p from the hyperparameter
describing the distribution of !t (more on this below).
Compared with similar latent trait models and with traditional cluster,
factor and discriminant analysis techniques, latent class models provide
a simpler and more robust way of summarizing patterns of categorical
responses while imposing less restrictive distributional assumptions
23. It is in fact possible to integrate both steps in a single estimation procedure. Given the
complexity of the problem, however, the computational burden of a single-step estimation
approach renders it very impractical for dealing with multiple large data sets, as in our case.
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that, using small simulated data sets, we found little
difference in the main substantive conclusions drawn from models estimated under the two
procedures.
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(McLachlan and Peel 2000). As a result, they have recently found a grow-
ing number of uses in political science (Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Jackman
2008; Treier and Jackman 2008). Virtually all applications in the polit-
ical science literature, though, assume a single relevant classiﬁcation
dimension.
In our setting, however, we need to classify both legislators into types
and roll calls into states. To implement this, we draw on two-sided clus-
tering methods used in collaborative ﬁltering (Ungar and Foster 1998;
Hoffman and Puzicha 1999), implementing a fully Bayesian approach
based on the Gibbs sampling algorithm that allows for the (probabilistic)
classiﬁcation of legislators into types and roll calls into states while sim-
ultaneously estimating q.24 The unknown types and states are treated as
random variables with missing values, which in the Bayesian framework
are essentially indistinguishable from other model parameters. Inference
thus requires deﬁning a prior for the indicators of type/state and the
remaining model parameters and sampling from their joint posterior
distribution.
Speciﬁcally, we proceed as follows. First, we specify a prior distribution
for the parameters 	, !, q.25 In particular, we assume that (a) qU[1/2, 1],
that (b) for each i2N, Pr(	i¼ j)¼ lj for j¼N, I, Y, and that (c) for each
roll call t2T, Pr(!t¼!A)¼ p. We give the hyperparameters lj and p dif-
fuse prior distributions fl and fp. We can then write a joint posterior dis-
tribution for the vector (	, !, q; l, p),
fð	; !; q; ; pjvÞ / Prðvj	; !; qÞfð	; !; qj; pÞfðÞfpðpÞ:
Note that given {	i} and {!t}, the mixture model essentially reduces to a
standard binary choice model, and it is thus quite straightforward to
sample from the conditional distribution of the remaining parameters.
Hence, the sampling algorithm alternates two major steps (Gelman
et al. 2004): (a) obtaining draws from the distribution of 	i and !t given
p, l, and q; and (b) obtaining draws from q and the hyperparameters p, l
given the type/state realizations. This leads to an iterative scheme
whereby, starting from an arbitrary set of initial values, we obtain a
sample of the parameters  m¼ (pm, lm, qm, 	m, !m) at each iteration m
of the algorithm, m¼ 1, . . . ,M. Under mild regularity conditions, the
24. The standard expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm typically used to ﬁtting
latent class models cannot be efﬁciently formulated for this problem, since intractably
many sufﬁcient statistics are required for the EM formulation (Ungar and Foster 1998).
25. Note that this treats the voting error  as given. In the results that we report in Section
6, we ﬁx this at ¼ 0.10. All major conclusions remain unchanged if we set ¼ 0.05. We also
repeated the analysis including  as an additional parameter to be estimated with the remain-
ing parameters of the model. Again, the results are fundamentally unchanged. Furthermore,
the estimated  ranges between values of 0.10 and 0.15 in all policy areas. These results are
reproduced in Figures 7–9 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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sampled parameters  m asymptotically satisfy  m  P( jvg) (Gilks et al.
1996; Gelman et al. 2004).26
Given the convergent samples, we assign each legislator to a type and
each roll call to a state based on their maximum a posteriori probabilities
(MAP). Given this assignment, we compute the net informative tally
tðvtÞ 
P
i:	i¼I vi for all bills that passed the House. Together with the
outcome of the bill in the Senate, the net informative tallies computed
in this way become the data in the second stage.
Second Stage
In the second step, we estimate the EMR equilibrium cutpoints 
g for
g¼ 1, . . . ,G. Consistent with Equation (3), we assume that the observed
outcomes z^t are conditionally distributed z^tMultinomialð1; ’tÞ, with
’t ¼ ð’Pt ; ’At ; ’Ft Þ0 and, for j¼P, A, F:
’jt ¼ jPðzt ¼ 1jtðg; vtÞ; 




zt ¼ 1jtðg; vtÞ; 
g
 ¼ tðg; vtÞ  
g ð5Þ
where F¼ P¼ 0, A¼ 1 P, A¼ 1 F, and where  is the cdf of a
standard normal variable. In the binary second-stage model we assume
P

z^t ¼ 1jtðg; vtÞ; 
g
 ¼ tðg; vtÞ  
g: ð6Þ
Prior Distributions and Model Checks
For each step of the estimation procedure, three parallel chains with dis-
persed initial values and varying lengths were run after an initial burn-in
period, with convergence assessed based on Gelman and Rubin’s potential
scale reduction factors bR (Gelman and Rubin 1992). We used independent
priors for the parameters in  : we assumed that l has a uniform Dirichlet
distribution, that pU[0, 1], and that q U[1/2, 1]. For the parameters of
the second stage, we assumed N (0, 100) distributions for 
g and, in the
case of the multinomial speciﬁcation (4) and (5), ,   Dirichlet(1, 1).
Routine sensitivity checks were performed to assess the robustness of
the estimates to the prior distributions. In all cases, the average overlap
between the prior and posterior distributions for the parameters governing
the latent class membership probabilities was quite small, and the (empir-
ical) Kullback–Leibler divergences were extremely high.27 This indicates
26. A well-known difﬁculty with MCMC estimation of posterior distributions in latent
class models is due to “label switching.” Brieﬂy put, the problem stems from the fact that
permutations of the class assignments are not necessarily identiﬁable since the likelihood may
be unchanged under these permutations (Redner andWalker 1984). Label switching is less of
an issue in our model, given the constraints on legislators’ voting behavior derived from the
theoretical model. In fact, visual inspection of theMCMC chains showed no evidence of label
switching, and application of the decision-theoretic postprocessing approach described by
Stephens (2000) did not result in changes in the class assignments.
27. Figure 1 in the Supplementary Appendix plots the prior and posterior probability
distributions of a legislator being informative, lI and of the proposal being of high quality p
for three issue areas (Economic, Judiciary, and Government). The ﬁgure shows that the
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that there is enough data to distinguish between the different types and
states, suggesting that the model is well identiﬁed, and thus relatively in-
sensitive to prior assumptions (Garrett and Zeger 2000). Model diagnos-
tics based on posterior predictive simulations (Gelman et al. 2004) showed
no systematic evidence of misﬁts to the data and indicated that the
(conditionally) independent Bernoulli distribution for legislators’ votes
is reasonable. In addition, in order to evaluate the ability of our estimation
strategy to recover the “true” model parameters and class memberships,
we used “fake-data simulations” (Gelman and Hill 2007) with several
alternative data sets. Classifying legislators and roll calls according to
the MAP led to very high rates of success in terms of agreement between
actual and estimated class membership, and the central 95% credible
intervals for the parameters of interest covered in all cases the true
values, with point estimates reasonably close to them.28
6. Main Results
In this section, we present our main results. For presentation purposes, we
focus here on nonunanimous votes OP.29 The main results are summar-
ized in Figure 4.
The top left panel presents the estimate of the signal precision for each
issue g, qg. The chart presents the median value, and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of (a sample of 1000 observations drawn from) the posterior
distribution of the parameters of the model. Note that the estimates in all
issues are very precise, as 90% of the mass of the posterior is concentrated
in a small interval around the median. In terms of the value of the esti-
mates, note that the precision of the signals is relatively large, close to 0.9
in all issue areas. This suggests that private information—information
dispersed in the system that has not been made public and incorporated
in the prior—is quite important. The moderate heterogeneity across issue
areas suggests that this conclusion holds independently of issue class, at
least within our relatively broad issue classiﬁcation.
The top right panel presents the estimate of the common prior prob-
ability that the proposal is of high quality, pgPr(!t¼!Aj(t)¼ g). To
calculate this, we ﬁrst compute for each point in the sample the proportion
of roll calls with !t¼!A, and then compute the median and 5–95 percent-
iles of this variable in the sample. The results suggest relatively moderate
beliefs about the quality or appropriateness of proposals being brought to
a vote in the House (possibly with the exception of the more favorable
average overlap between prior and posterior distributions is quite small. Similar patterns are
veriﬁed across parameters and issue areas.
28. Details from different simulation exercises and robustness checks are available from
the authors upon request. See also the Supplementary Materials.
29. Figures 4 and 5 in the Supplementary Appendix summarize the results for SRP votes.
Although there are interesting differences in the details between these and bills considered
OP, the main results remain unchanged.
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expectations in Foreign Relations). This is consistent with our previous
ﬁnding in terms of the value of private information in the system.
The middle panels show the proportion of members of the House voting
informatively (left) and the proportion of members of the House voting
unconditionally for the proposal (right). Recall that each point in the
sample from the posterior distribution includes a type for each legislator.
Thus for each point in the sample we can compute the proportion of
legislators of each behavioral type. The chart presents the median, and
5–95 percentiles of this variable in the sample. The results show that,
according to our estimates, a large fraction of the House votes according
to their private information in each case. With the exception of Foreign
Relations, the proportion of representatives voting informatively ranges
from a relatively low 40% in the case of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in
Figure 4. Precision, Prior, Distribution of Types, and Endogenous Majority Rule in Votes
OP (¼ 0.10).
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Judiciary bills. In Foreign Relations the proportion is higher still: about
70% of the total members vote informatively. The fact that this is large
relative to the EMR cutpoint (lower left panel) means that the public
signal generated by the informative tally of votes in favor of the proposal
in the House can in fact sway the outcome in the Senate one way or the
other. Moreover, most individuals that do not vote informatively vote
unconditionally for the proposal; i.e., the fraction of representatives
voting unconditionally against the proposal is relatively low across the
different issue areas (as high as 6–7% for Foreign Relations and
Government Operations, substantially lower in all other issues).
The bottom left panel shows the EMR voting equilibrium cutpoint in
the Senate, as estimated in the benchmark second-stage speciﬁcation (4)
and (5). This is the smallest net number of favorable votes among indi-
viduals voting informatively in the House for which the Senate passes the
bill in equilibrium. The results show that these EMR cutpoints are rela-
tively large in all areas, with a smallest value of 23 in Judiciary, and a
largest value of 108 in Appropriations.
As it is implied by the name, the EMR equilibrium cutpoint effectively
imposes a supermajority rule on the House, which can be computed given
our estimates. Note that a cutpoint 
 means that in order for the bill to
pass the Senate, we need at least 
 net votes of the members of the House
voting informatively. This in turn means that if there are nY partisan lib-
erals and nN partisan conservatives, we need at least 
+ nY nN net votes
out of all votes in total for the bill to pass the Senate (nY nN) is the net
uninformative tally). But this in turn means that in order for the bill to
pass the Senate we need at least ð
 þ nY  nN þ nÞ=ð2Þ positive votes in
total to pass the Senate. Thus, the rule for the entire chamber is
R ¼ ð






 þ nY  nN
2n
:
Similarly, we can compute the hurdle imposed on the set of individuals
voting informatively. This effective rule for the informative voters fol-
lows quite directly from the EMR equilibrium cutpoint. A cutpoint 

means that in order for the bill to pass the Senate, we need at least
RI ¼ ð
 þ nIÞ=ð2Þ positive votes among the nI members of the House
voting informatively. Thus, in terms of the fraction of the total number









The bottom right panel shows R/n and RI/nI for each issue area.
The implied supermajority on the entire chamber is R/n. 4/5 on average
across areas. In other words, bicameralism is transformed in equilibrium
into a unicameral system with a 4/5 supermajority rule. On the other hand,
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the threshold imposed on the members voting informatively is about
RI/nI. 2/3 on average across areas. Both R/n and RI/nI have signiﬁcant
variation across issue areas. In particular, the EMR R/n is relatively low
for Foreign Relations (0.62) and largest for Economic issues (0.87) and
Appropriations (0.89). Similarly, the hurdle for members voting inform-
atively is relatively lower for Foreign Relations (0.56) and Judiciary (0.55),
and largest for Economic issues (0.72) and Appropriations (0.80).30
As a robustness check, we also compute the estimated cutpoints and
implied supermajority rules using the binary second-stage model (6). As
seen in Figure 5, the EMR equilibrium cutpoints are similar—in magni-
tude and in the relative ordering of the policy areas/congressional ses-
sions—to those obtained based on (4) and (5), although somewhat
larger and more precisely estimated (due to the more parsimonious spe-
ciﬁcation). The implied supermajority rules and the thresholds imposed on
members voting informatively are also comparable with those reported in
Figure 4, though slightly higher. The supermajority threshold R/n aver-
ages 5/6 across areas and 6/7 across legislative terms. Likewise, RI/nI. 5/7
over all policy areas and .3/4 over time. Hence, the substantive conclu-
sions regarding the equilibrium cutpoints and the effective endogenous
majority rules do not seem to be especially sensitive to the parametrization
of the second-stage model.31
Errors and Welfare
Although until now we have focused exclusively on the positive implica-
tions of the model, our estimates allow us to compute a measure of welfare
based on the empirical frequency of type I and type II errors in Congress.
The upper panel of Figure 6 plots the sample estimates of the probabil-
ity of the type I error (not passing high-quality bills), and type II error
(passing low-quality bills) for votes OP across policy areas.32 The most
striking result is that the probability of a type I error (eI) is on average
30. The main ﬁndings discussed above hold session by session, throughout the whole
period under study. Figure 2 in the Supplementary Appendix presents the signal precision
(top left panel), the proportion of legislators voting informatively (top right panel), the equi-
librium cutpoint (bottom left panel) and the implied supermajority rule (bottom right panel),
for every Congress between 1991 and 2006. As illustrated in the ﬁgure, the estimates ﬂuctuate
much less across legislative sessions than between policy areas. The precision of the signals is
higher than 0.9 in eachCongress, roughly half of theHousemembers vote informatively every
term, and R/n is around 4/5 in all legislative sessions. The effective threshold on informative
voters is also quite stable, oscillating between 0.67 (109th Congress) and 0.73 (103rd
Congress).
31. It is worth noting that, based on the estimates of 
,  and  from our benchmark
second-stage speciﬁcation, the posterior probability of a bill having passed the Senate given
that we observe an amendment, Prðzt ¼ 1jz^t ¼ AÞ, averages 0.64 across policy areas. Thus we
are classifying amended bills as relatively likely to have passed, which helps explain the close
relationship between the results of the multinomial and binary second-stage models.
32. The estimates in SRP votes are reported in Figure 6 of the Supplementary Appendix,
and the estimates for the binary and ordered second-stage models in Figures 12 and 17. These
results exhibit similar patterns as in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
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about twice as high as the probability of a type II error (eII). This is true
on average across issues, and also issue by issue, with the exception of
Appropriations. The likelihood ratio is about 1.5 in Foreign Relations, 3
in Government, and 6 in Economics. It is particularly large in Judiciary
bills, where the probability of a type I error is close to 60%, but the
probability of a type II error is <1%.
The difference between the probability of a type I and type II
error is larger in those issue areas in which the prior probability p
of the proposal being “good” is lower (e.g., Economic issues and
Judiciary) and narrower in those with higher p (such as Foreign
Figure 5. Equilibrium Cutpoints and Endogenous Majority Rule in Votes OP (¼ 0.10),
Binary Second-Stage Model.
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Figure 6. Empirical Frequency of Legislative Errors and Expected Utility in Votes OP
(¼ 0.10).
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Relations and Appropriations). Moreover, even in Appropriations,
p eI> (1 p) eII. Hence, the expected utility of an individual with
bias , EU ¼ p "I þ 

p "I  ð1 pÞ  "II

, is increasing in  for
all the policy areas under analysis. It follows that welfare is larger for
more “conservative” individuals, for whom the cost of passing a bad pro-
posal is larger (see Figure 6, lower panel).33
Comparison with the Sincere Spatial Voting Model
In Section 3.1 (Figure 3), we presented the comparison between the pre-
dicted passage of bills in the Senate implied by the spatial voting model
(OC estimates) and the actual Senate outcomes. We can now extend this
comparison to include our results.
Figure 7 contrasts the actual passage rates in the Senate with the pre-
dictions rates for the sequential committees model and the SSV model
(assuming both a simple majority rule and a three-ﬁfths majority
rule).34 For each and every policy area, the sequential committees model
clearly outperforms the SSV model under either of the voting rule in this
comparison.35 Overall, 20% of the bills in our sample were actually
approved in the Senate. The average predicted passage rates for the SSV
model are 95 and 78% assuming a simple majority and a three-ﬁfths
majority rule, respectively. For the sequential committees model, on the
other hand, the corresponding rates are 28% under the multinomial
second-stage model (4) and (5) and 36% under the binary model (6).
What is more, the sequential committees model also ﬁts individual votes
quite well. In order to assess the performance of the model at predicting
individual votes, we simulated an nT matrix of replicated roll call votes
vRep from the predictive distribution pðvRepj ¼ b Þ, where b is the vec-
tor of point estimates (posterior medians) of the parameters.36 We
then computed the proportion of correctly predicted individual votes,P
i;t IðvRepi;t ¼ vi;tÞ=n T, and compared it with the value obtained from
the OC estimates. The difference between both models turns out to be
relatively small: the proportion of correctly predicted votes is 0.78 for the
33. An alternative interpretation of these results is that passing low-quality bills is actually
the more costly mistake—i.e., the “true” type I error. The proponents of the bill thus bear the
burden of proof to persuade the other legislators—especially the “conservative” members—
that the proposal is in fact “good.”We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
34. Figures 13 and 18 in the Supplementary Appendix reproduce this comparison using
the estimates from the binary and ordered second-stage models, respectively.
35. The same is true for comparisons over time: the sequential committees model ﬁts the
data better than the SSV model for every single congressional term between 1991 and 2006.
See Figures 3, 14, and 19 in the Supplementary Appendix.
36. Our Bayesian estimation actually allows generating a replicated matrix vRep,m for each
sample m drawn from the posterior distribution of  . To enhance comparability with the
predictions obtained using the OC point estimates, we report the results for a single replica-
tion generated from pðvRepj ¼ b Þ. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 4, the parameters of the
sequential committees model are very precisely estimated, so the substantial conclusions
remain essentially unchanged when using several draws of vRep.
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sequential committees model and 0.81 for the SSV model. The fraction of
correctly predicted votes for each legislator ranges from 0.54 to 0.97 for
the sequential committees model and from 0.48 to 0.99 for the SSV model.
For 95% of the legislators, both models correctly predict more than 70%
of their votes.
6.1 Do Party Labels Explain Behavior?
Up to now, we have been agnostic about whether party labels identify the
preferences and behavior of members of Congress. In particular, we chose
not to assume from the outset that members of the majority party are
predisposed in favor of the proposal, and members of the minority party
are predisposed against the proposal.
Having said this, it is reasonable to expect that at the very least, parties
will tend to bundle like-minded individuals. Thus it is interesting to see
whether there is a correlation between the types we identify in the analysis
and their partisan afﬁliation. A particular hypothesis of interest is that
members of the majority party are typically biased in favor of the proposal
(and thus vote unconditionally for the proposal) and that members of the
minority party are typically biased against the proposal, and then either
Figure 7. Actual and Predicted Passage Rates in the Senate for the Sequential
Committees Model and the Spatial Voting Model.
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vote informatively or vote unconditionally against the proposal. Is this
hypothesis consistent with our results?
The top panel of Figure 8 plots the proportion of members of the ma-
jority party classiﬁed as voting unconditionally for the proposal (bar) and
the proportion of members of the minority party classiﬁed as voting in-
formatively (line) per congress for Appropriations, Economic, and Other
issues. The pattern here is in line with the hypothesis in the previous
paragraph: although there are some notable exceptions, in most sessions
and issues the individuals we classify as voting unconditionally for the
proposal are (mostly) members of the majority, and the individuals that
we classify as voting informatively are (mostly) members of the minority.
On the other hand, party labels are far from explaining all relevant
behavior. The lower panel of the ﬁgure mimics the upper panel but for
Foreign Relations, Government Operations, and Judiciary. The results
are different altogether. Although there are some periods and issues for
which we observe the same pattern as in the previous case, this is not the
norm. Instead, in several issues/Congress observations, a majority of
members of both parties vote informatively. Still in other instances, a
signiﬁcant fraction of the minority party votes unconditionally against
the proposal. We conclude that although party labels do explain some
behavior—in particular within Appropriations and Economic areas—
they are generically a poor estimate for behavioral types in our model.37
More broadly—and given that the period under analysis witnessed a
remarkable shift in the balance of power within the US Congress (Dodd
2001)—it is worth exploring whether and to what extent the conclusions
of the sequential committees model depend on the identity of the party
controlling the legislature.38 Table 1 presents the posterior medians of
the relevant model parameters across all issue areas, disaggregated by
the identity of the party holding a majority of the seats in the House.
Overall, the results indicate that the basic ﬁndings highlighted in the pre-
vious sections remain valid regardless of which party is “in charge”—
namely, that information about the quality of the proposals scattered
among members of the House plays an inﬂuential role in the
decision-making process of the US Congress, and that a sizable propor-
tion of them vote according to their private signals.
7. Conclusion
This article makes what we believe is a signiﬁcant contribution to the
debate about the policy consequences of adopting a bicameral legislative
37. A more detailed analysis of the role of parties in this context is left for future research.
38. Following the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans held the majority in both cham-
bers for the ﬁrst time in 40 years. Democrats would only regain control of the House and
Senate in the 110th Congress. A detailed account of the “Republican Revolution” and its
policy implications is beyond the scope of this article. See Dodd (2001) and the references
therein for an excellent overview.
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Figure 8. Proportion of Members of the Majority Party Voting Unconditionally for the
Proposal, and Proportion of Members of the Minority Party Voting Informatively, by
Issue Area and Congress.
Table 1. Parameter Estimates, Disaggregated by the Identity of the Majority Party
Majority party q p Proportion of 	i¼ I R/n RI/nI
Democratic 0.93 0.54 0.47 0.84 0.72
Republican 0.93 0.51 0.49 0.81 0.68
All areas/Congresses 0.93 0.52 0.48 0.82 0.69
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body. One set of consequences is well understood. Since at least
Montesquieu (1748), bicameralism has been seen and used as a tool to
represent and protect the interests of special minorities (the aristocracy,
the states). Tsebelis and Money (1997) call this the political aspect of bi-
cameralism. There is a second, equally important argument in the debate,
championed by Madison in the Federalist papers (Hamilton et al. 1788).
This second aspect, which Tsebelis and Money (1997) call the “efﬁciency”
dimension of bicameralism, sees bicameralism as a tool to improve
the quality of political decisions. How this happens, and to what extent
does bicameralism actually enhance the quality of public policy, is less
understood.
In this article, we explored the “efﬁciency”motivation of bicameralism.
We presented a model incorporating both ideology and common values
into legislative decision-making, and argued that the data are consistent
with an equilibrium in which the Senate only approves the House bills that
receive the support of a supermajority of members of the House. We then
estimated the parameters of the model using the votes of members of the
House and the Senate. We obtained three major conclusions:
(a) First, we ﬁnd that private information dispersed in the system is
signiﬁcant. For one, a large fraction of the House votes according
to their private information in each case (from 40% in the case
of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary bills). Moreover,
the results show that the informativeness or precision of the signals
is relatively large, above 0.8 in all issue areas and sessions of
Congress.
(b) Second, we show that the endogenous supermajority imposed on
the House is R/n. 4/5 on average across areas and over time, a
ﬁnding that is robust to alternative model speciﬁcations. In other
words, bicameralism is effectively equivalent to a unicameral
system with a four-ﬁfths supermajority rule. This endogenous ma-
jority rule diverges signiﬁcantly between areas: close to two-thirds
for Foreign Relations, and larger for Economic issues (0.87) and
Appropriations (0.89). On the other hand, there is basically no
variation in the implied supermajority across congressional terms
or the identity of the majority party.
(c) Third, we show that the probability of a type I error in Congress is
on average about twice as high as the probability of a type II error
(passing a low-quality bill). This is true on average across issues,
and also issue by issue, with the exception of Appropriations. The
discrepancy is lower in Foreign Relations and larger in Economics
and Judiciary Bills.
This article also provides a signiﬁcant methodological contribution
to the analysis of voting in legislatures. To our knowledge, our article
represents the ﬁrst study to estimate a model of voting in bicameral legis-
latures that allows for common values with dispersed information in
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an equilibrium context. This complements recent efforts in the literature to
incorporate strategic considerations to the analysis of voting in legisla-
tures and courts.
In spite of the advances, much work is left for future research. Three
directions are noteworthy. First, we see this article as a ﬁrst step towards
achieving a more general framework that can fully integrate the spatial
model alongside with common value components and dispersed informa-
tion. In particular, it would be desirable to allow broader heterogeneity
in the biases of different individuals, as well as in the precision of their
information (see Iaryczower and Shum 2012a), for a step in this direction
within a single-committee setting). Second, it is also the key to reﬁne this
family of models by testing their empirical implications, and comparing
their success against other possible explanations for the patterns we un-
cover here. Finally, we hope that this article will engage other researchers
to expand the application of the framework to other legislatures and in-
stitutions around the world.
Supplementaty Material
Supplementary Material is available at Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization online.
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